The Charlie Hebdo trial
The long-awaited trial for the case of the massacre in the satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo” is taking place in Paris these days. The macabre history is more or less known, that is, on January 7, 2015, two fanatical Islamists broke into his offices and opened fire indiscriminately, shooting at those who happened to be in front of them to “hell” their “reprehensible” contribution to publication of a form with which they disagreed.
In fact, the unprecedented murderous “amok” – recalling the indiscriminate assassination attempt on Bataklan in November of that year – was attributed to an “offensive” cartoon of Muhammad in a way that dramatically verifies was published this month under the title “All this for this” (Tout ca pour ca). Given that the natural perpetrators of this heinous crime were killed, relatives and friends are sitting on the bench of justice with the accusation of their criminal involvement, with the result that the interest of the trial is mainly focused on the ideological background that triggered this unacceptable reaction.
In other words, the central question of the permissible limits of freedom of expression is rekindled, and in particular whether the latter should “stop” when it begins to harass third parties. The common European heritage provides an unequivocal, if not overwhelming, answer to this dilemma: freedom of expression is understood primarily as the freedom to externalize dissent, in other words, the freedom to express the otherness of the minority as majorities from the dominant ideology. Of course, this certainly does not mean that it can be unlimited and exactly the point where the red line that prohibits its crossing should be placed is where it is disputed.
In this case, it is crucial to make a distinction, it is a matter of expressing a journalistic point of view, so it is necessary to have the required accuracy and decency in what is mentioned for reasons of respecting the function of the journalistic function as a key factor shaping Public Opinion and therefore pillar of the democratic function, and another issue is satire, which inherently involves the artistic element. Of course, in the broadest sense, satire is a political act because its ultimate goal is to convey a message to its recipients, but beyond that it is not intended to inform per se but to the personal expression of those who measure its artistic vehicle resulting in its boundaries to be deleted much more widely. The problem, however, is that humor is a subjective affair, especially when it “hits” the “Achilles'” heel of its recipients, sometimes provoking frantic reactions. Then one can reasonably ask whether only the “judges” have rights and not the “judges”, who experience a sense of injustice and want to express their dissatisfaction with it.
The question is whether they are entitled to restrict freedom of satirical expression due to the fact that they experience a personal sense of diminution and devaluation. In other words, the question arises as to whether the right to free expression corresponds to a right to “feeling offended”. There does not seem to be a general and absolute answer to this question, but instead both the specific circumstances of each case and the object of the satire itself should be considered.
Thus, a priori rules cannot be formulated, which would otherwise be tantamount to impermissible censorship, but it is crucial to evaluate certain critical elements, such as the transmitter of satire, that is, whether it is generally satirical or it is selective on certain issues only. , the character of satire, that is, whether it has an artistic character or not, the object of satire in the sense of whether it targets a general category of persons.
For example, we think that fortunately nowadays a “joke” about the Holocaust would be considered unacceptable because the belief in the international community about the unacknowledged tragedy experienced by its millions of victims has been consolidated and the same must be accepted with the ubiquitous genocides, such as the genocide of Pontian Hellenism. But apart from these “solved” historical issues, the disputed case raises the current issue in our time of respect for the freedom of religious conscience, which in essence claims to redefine freedom of expression.
In this dilemma, an absolute precedent in the religious freedom of religious persons can not be recognized because in the final analysis atheists are entitled to “exist”. Fortunately, however, one wonders if the public again